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Abstract 
Digital platforms dominate the global, contemporary economy. Therefore, 
incumbent firms must transform their existing business, often structured as a 
pipeline, into a platform business. This study investigates the process of 
platformization and how established firms can leverage their core assets in order to 
launch a digital platform and grow their installed base. The coring and tipping theory 
by Gawer and Cusumano (2008) is used as a conceptual framework and is carefully 
applied during the analysis of results. I conducted a case study at a start-up which 
operates in the eHealth sector. I analyzed empirical data in form of transaction data, 
documents, presentations, and interviews in order to make observations on the 
platformization process. My study resulted in five guidelines on the platformization 
process: Guarantee a smooth transition for existing customers, Develop a hybrid 
business model, Reuse the technology, Capture spillover of trust, and Shift to 
resource orchestration. The finding can guide other firms which find themselves in 
the platformization process. I further contribute to the theory by expanding the theory 
of coring and tipping.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Digital Platforms are the rising businesses of the last two decades and, with all we 
know, this trend will not end soon (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006; Parker, 
Van Alsytne & Choudary, 2016; Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Airbnb 
tackling the hotel industry, Amazon revolutionizing retail, and Uber disrupting the 
taxi industry are only three out of many examples. They are examples of how digital 
platforms dominate the global, contemporary economy. They do this without 
generating value units themselves, but they match the needs of different user groups. 
In other words, the value unit creation is not the core activity of a platform owner, 
but it facilitates the connection of users that generate the value themselves. To be 
competitive in this emerging, digital economy, incumbent firms must transform their 
existing business, often structured as value chains, into a platform business.  
 
The process of transforming an existing business into a platform is often referred to 
as “platformization” (Islind et al., 2016). Platformization comes with many 
challenges and firms must make difficult decisions along the process. Analyzing 
platformization is challenging because it is context-dependent (Zhu & Furr, 2016). 
Previous research analyses the environment and settings in different markets and 
points out different approaches and strategies to fulfil a successful platformization 
(Parker et al., 2016; Van Alsytne et al., 2016; Zhu & Furr, 2016). Many papers show 
how successful platforms made their way, but only little is known about the process 
to shift from a traditional business to a digital platform. Overall, research is missing 
an in-depth analysis of the platformization process and investigation of the strategy 
decisions that firms makes. In particular, we know little about how incumbent firms 
convert an existing customer into platform users.  
 
Researchers sometimes approach the challenge of platformization by analyzing the 
relation between “core” and “complementarities” (Teece, 2018). The core is the 
center of the firm and can be a technology, product, or service. The users of the core 
are usually the customer base. Complementarities surround the core and offer 
additional services to users of the core. In order to fulfill a successful platformization, 
the core and complementarities must be managed together very carefully to reduce 
tensions. On the one hand, introducing new complementarities may jeopardize 
existing revenue streams that are needed to keep the business running. On the other 
hand, the complementarities can be used to attract new users to the platform. In the 
process of platformization, a firm needs to fulfil a shift of focus from the core to 
complementarities (Van Alstyne et al., 2016; Zhu & Furr, 2016). While existing 
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research elaborates on the relation between core and complementarities, it is still 
unclear how firms strategically implement such shifts in practice.  
 
Addressing this gap, the objective of this thesis is to bring more light into the 
practical platformization by providing an in-depth analysis of an eHealth start-up. I 
do so by adapting the “coring” and “tipping” theory by Gawer and Cusumano (2008) 
and the underlying approaches and assumptions because it provides a framework to 
analyze how the firm can leverage their different assets. Coring, which does not 
originate from the term core used by Teece (2018), addresses the challenges of 
creating a new platform where none exists yet. Tipping tackles the problem of how 
to win platform wars against other firms by building the largest installed base. This 
theoretical model guided the data collection process, but in particular it was carefully 
applied when analyzing data. By doing so, I answer the following research question:  
 
How do established firms leverage core assets to launch a platform and grow the 
installed base? 
 
In order to answer the research question, I turn to a company in the eHealth industry 
that operates in the dental sector. I analyzed the transaction data from mid-2018 to 
beginning of 2020, conducted several qualitative interviews with the three co-
founders of the company, analyzed documents, and examined presentations. By 
doing so, I provide an in-depth analysis of the platformization process of a single 
firm. I use these insights to contribute to practice five guidelines for a successful 
platformization. I further contribute to theory that coring and tipping strategies can 
be used in combination to leverage core assets and grow the installed base.  
3 
2 Previous Research  
The existing literature on platforms and platformization is varied and extensive. To 
understand this subject, it is important to explore the environment in which it exists.  
2.1 Digital Platforms  
Platforms have been looked at from different perspectives over time in previous 
research, and many of the characteristics overlap. Three distinct definitions emerged 
over time (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). First, product development researchers use 
the term to describe a product or family of products that is generated for a particular 
firm. Platform products aim to meet the needs of a core user group but are designed 
for easy modification (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992 as cited in Baldwin & Woodard, 
2009). Second, platforms are referred to as technological ecosystems. The platform 
is the valuable point of control and only few dominant platforms exists (Bresnahan 
& Greenstein, 1999 as citied in Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) then use the term platform to characterize products, services, firms, or 
institutions that facilitate transactions between two or more user groups (as cited in 
Baldwin & Woodard 2009). Fellow researchers then adopt this definition 
(Eisenmann, 2008; Hagiu, 2008; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). The notion of two-
sided (or multi-sided) markets concentrates on the macro-economic aspect and sees 
platforms as one part of an ecosystem with different forces (Rysman, 2009). 
Conclusively, platforms mostly operate in two-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole 
2003). In this paper, I will use the term platform initially provided by Rochet and 
Tirole (2003), which is then further developed by other researchers. Parker, 
Eisenmann, van Alstyne, and few of their co-authors provide the core literature in 
the field of digital platforms. 
There are many prominent examples of successful platforms in the digital world, like 
Spotify, Airbnb, and eBay. In each of these examples, the platform itself does not 
create value units or items: Spotify does not produce music, Airbnb does not own 
any apartments, and eBay does not own any items. They all create value by matching 
user groups with each other: Spotify connects artists with listeners, Airbnb connects 
hosts with tourists, and eBay connects seller and buyer. While all of these examples 
emerged in the previous years and rely heavily on digital infrastructures, there are 
other examples from former times, for example the credit card, travel agencies, and 
newspapers. Credit Card companies like Visa or MasterCard simply connect 
merchants with consumers, travel agencies connect tourists and trips, and 
newspapers connect subscribers and advertisers (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Van 
Alstyne & Parker, 2017).  
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Figure 1: The players in a platform ecosystem (Adapted from van Alsytne et al., 2016) 
 
What all platforms have in common is the underlying architecture of the ecosystem 
(Figure 1). The platform itself consists of two players: The platform owner and 
platform provider. The platform owner is responsible for the rules and management 
of the platform, while the platform provider controls the interfaces to access the 
platform. Together they provide the infrastructure for producers and consumers to 
exchange value, data and feedback with each other (van Alsytne et al., 2016). This 
approach to look at a digital platform provides a comprehensive understanding how 
the different players of a platform ecosystem fit together.  
2.2 Pipelines vs. Platforms 
Contrasting to platforms, value-chain-oriented businesses are referred to in the 
literature as “pipelines” (van Alstyne et al., 2016). It is called a pipeline because the 
value stream is linear and flows from left to right. On the left side of the business are 
the costs to run a business and on the left side is the revenue. Very simplified, the 
firm buys certain goods that are then processed and later sold for a margin (Porter, 
1985). In other words, the pipeline business generates value by controlling a linear 
series of steps (van Alsytne et al., 2016). Existing literature on strategies to optimize 
a pipeline business concentrates on how to make the value chain more efficient. This 
includes the internal value chain itself, as well as buying-strategies and strategies to 
sell the product with the most revenue (Porter, 1985). Platforms on the other hand 
do not have a value chain, since the value creation lies in connecting two sides of a 
5 
market with each other and not shipping a product to a consumer. This calls for a 
fundamentally different approach to manage a platform business.  
 
With the changing business models, also the challenges that businesses are facing 
change rapidly. Since pipeline businesses follow a linear supply chain, the strategies 
often included to make each step in the value chain more efficient in order to generate 
a more efficient overall process (Porter, 1985). Platforms do not follow the linear 
process of pipeline businesses, instead their whole purpose is to make an interaction 
possible and as valuable as possible to all participants (Parker et al., 2016). Parker et 
al. (2016) describe that platforms must perform three key functions to ensure that 
valuable interactions take place: (1) pull, (2) facilitate and (3) match. (1) The 
platform must pull producers and consumers towards the platform. While pipeline 
businesses focus on pushing their product to the market using a wide variety of 
marketing and pricing strategies, platform businesses face different challenges. One 
of the driving factors for platforms are “network effects”. Network effects describe 
the phenomenon that the value of the platform increases with an increasing number 
of users (Halaburda & Oberholzer-Gee, 2014; Hanseth & Aanestad, 2003; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994). Logically, the value for the first users is comparatively small. A 
second pull challenge is to keep users interested and motivate them to come back 
after their first visit on the platform. (2) The platform must facilitate the interaction 
between producers and consumers by providing them with a tool to connect easily 
with each other. Furthermore, the rules and tools should encourage the value 
exchange between the different players. Compared to pipeline businesses, platforms 
are not directly involved in the value creation process. Instead, they create a set of 
rules defining in which ways value can be generated and exchanged and define 
principles that govern these processes. (3) The platform must match the producers 
and consumers efficiently. The platform does so by analyzing all existing data to find 
the optimal match between the consumer and producer needs. It’s the biggest 
challenge of a platform to balance these three key functions.  
 
Even though pipeline businesses have dominated the industry for the most part of 
the 20th century, more and more platforms are evolving in all different kinds of 
industries. They do that with a lot of success. As Van Alsytne et al. (2016) claim:  
 
When a platform enters the market of a pure pipeline business, the platform 
virtually always wins. 
 
The success of platforms leads to new phenomenon, the platformization of pipeline 
industries and firms in order to compete with emerging platforms.  
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2.3 Platformization 
Platform businesses are disrupting nearly every industry, but that does not mean 
incumbent pipeline companies will capitulate and leave the market to the platforms. 
When the first instinct to fight the new platforms vanishes, many companies try to 
become a platform themselves to still be competitive in the market (Parker et al., 
2016). This process is called platformization. As well as the term of a platform itself, 
also the term platformization can be viewed from a more technological or 
economical point. Viewed from a technological perspective, it is referred to as the 
process where software product solutions are transformed into a platform-oriented 
digital infrastructure (Bygstad & Hanseth, 2018). It is further defined by the 
characteristic of making a product accessible from external resources, for example 
through an API (Helmond, 2015). In this paper, I will follow the definition of Islind 
et al. (2016) that refers to the term platformization as the process of establishing a 
platform because it also includes the economical perspective. In this thesis, I consider 
platformization as the process of establishing and growing a platform from an 
existing product or pipeline business.  
2.3.1 Shifts in Strategy 
Van Alsytne et al. (2016) observe three key shifts when moving from pipeline to 
platform. (1) From resource control to resource orchestration. When running a 
pipeline business, it is essential to control the own resources in order to make the 
value chain as efficient as possible. This includes controlling as much of the value 
chain as possible. For platforms on the other hand, the true value lies in the efficient 
orchestration of external resources, meaning that managing the relations between 
producers and consumers is the most important asset for a platform business. The 
producers and consumers themselves are assets, which generate value for the 
platform owner. (2) From internal optimization to external interaction. Since the 
value chain is closed in itself and has strict borders, management often concentrates 
on optimizing the value creating process. Platforms concentrate on managing their 
relationships to producers and consumers to make the interaction as efficient as 
possible so that value can be generated. (3) From a focus on customer value to a 
focus on ecosystem value. Pipeline businesses intend to maximize the value for the 
customer who sits at the end of every value chain in order to generate more revenue. 
Platforms seek to maximize the value of their whole ecosystem, since a higher 
ecosystem value usually also means a higher value for every player in the ecosystem. 
Overall, the competition and markets of a platform are more complicated and 
dynamic (Van Alstyne et al., 2016).  
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2.3.2 Platformization Strategies 
Parker et al. (2016) introduce two platformization strategies, the “follow-the-rabbit 
strategy” and the “single-side-strategy”, which both use the already existing installed 
base. The installed base describes the users, which use a specific product or service 
(Star & Bowker 2006). An example for the follow-the-rabbit strategy is the online 
retailer Amazon. Amazon operated as a profitable pipeline business, which used 
online product listings to attract consumers. With the installed base from that 
pipeline business, Amazon transformed itself to a platform by opening up the other 
side to external producers. The result is Amazon Marketplace, which connects 
millions of consumers and retailers every day (Parker et al., 2016; Zhu & Furr, 2016). 
An example of the single-side strategy is the restaurant reservation management app 
OpenTable. It first started as a booking management software that restaurants could 
use to manage their restaurant internally. Once they had reached a critical mass of 
restaurants, they opened up the other side of the platform to allow consumers to make 
online reservations themselves (Parker et al., 2016). The two strategies provided by 
Parker et al. (2016) are rather broad and give little insight on which steps a pipeline 
business must do in order to become a successful platform.  
2.3.3 Products to Platforms 
Zhu and Furr (2016) analyze more than 20 firms which wanted to become platform 
providers and identified four steps that can make the difference. (1) Start with a 
defensible product and a critical mass of users. Incumbent firms have a great 
advantage over platform start-ups: They do not have to solve the “chicken-or-egg-
problem”, which is a metaphor describing situations where it is not clear, which of 
two events should be considered the cause and which should be considered the effect; 
or to express the difficulty of sequencing actions where each seems to depend on 
others being done first (Plutarch, 1909). While start-ups often fail to generate a 
critical mass of users after the launch of their platform, incumbent firms already have 
an installed base of users. Zhu and Furr (2016) mention not to use platformization to 
revive an already struggling product with a small installed base. (2) Apply a hybrid 
business model focused on creating and sharing value. Previous research assumes 
that platform owners must commit to either a platform-based or a product-based 
business model. This may be true for start-ups and other companies which start from 
scratch, but for companies that transform from pipeline to platform it may be 
valuable to use a hybrid business model during the transition. While consumers start 
to derive benefits from use of complementary services, the firm’s own product often 
remains the primary attraction. That should be reflected in the business model. (3) 
Drive Rapid Conversion to the new platform. It is important to convert users of the 
product or service to users of the platform. The platform leaders can do so by 
providing adequate value, stay consistent with the brand and involve users in 
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improvements. (4) Identify and act on opportunities to deter competitive imitation. 
To be able to do that, platform owners should consider which of the services they 
want to offer themselves and which should be offered by third parties. Another way 
to gain a competitive advantage is to get exclusive contracts with partners which 
slow down the growth of possible competitors. Zhu & Furr (2016) give very 
interesting insights to the development of the business model and which ideas should 
be considered but little still little is known about the actual process of 
platformization. 
2.3.4 Core and Complementarities 
Long before digital platforms, Teece (1986) introduced his theory about “core” and 
“complementarities” to capture value from an innovation. In the framework, Teece 
(1986) refers to the core as an innovation that consists of technological knowledge 
about how to do things better than the competition. He claims that in order to profit 
from this innovation, a firm almost always needs other capabilities or assets: 
Complementarities. Complementarities can be supporting activities such as 
marketing or after-sales support but can also be sold together with the core as a 
complementary services or product, such as an operating system with a computer 
(Teece, 2018). In the case of digital platforms, complementarities are often used as 
main source of profits while the core is free or subsidized. For example, in the video 
game industry, consoles are often sold under production cost and the profit is 
generated by selling video games (Eisenmann et al, 2006). In the platformization-
process, the organization often sees itself with a service or product, which is 
responsible for generating the revenue. Furthermore, an organization may or not 
have complementarities offered to their consumers. When transforming the business 
model from a linear pipeline strategy to a platform business model, organizations 
should aim to shift the revenue generation from the core product or service towards 
the complementarities in order to maximize exponential effects. The core and 
complementarities theory by Teece (1986, 2018) provides a good understanding of 
how value can be captured from innovation, but little is written about how to 
transform a business from core-oriented to platform-oriented.  
 
The previous sections described many, but not all dimensions and decisions an 
organization has to make, when they want to enter a new market or build a new 
platform. Naturally, it is not possible for researchers to give organizations a recipe 
or detailed plan on how to be successful. They instead aim to give organizations the 
right tools and thinking approaches to make the best possible decisions themselves. 
Most decisions are strongly dependent from the industry, existing markets and 
organizations, as well as regulations. One of these theoretical dimensions is decisions 
between a coring strategy or a tipping strategy (Gawer & Cusumano 2008).  
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3 Conceptual Framework 
In this thesis I set out to study the process of platformization. In particular, I seek a 
deeper understanding of how core assets can be leveraged in order to launch a 
platform and grow the installed base. As I have demonstrated, that involves different 
dimensions and an intricate balancing of many factors. To do such an analysis, I will 
use a theoretical framework on coring and tipping, originally developed by Gawer 
and Cusumano (2008). Gawer and Cusumano (2008) point out that strategies for 
products and platforms must be different in its nature. They show that the reason for 
that is mainly the fact that digital platforms require complementary innovations to 
be useful. In their work, they develop two basic approaches: Coring and tipping. I 
will use this theory by Gawer and Cusumano (2008) as a conceptional framework to 
have a lens of analysis for the results. 
 
Coring addresses the challenges of creating a new platform where one has not existed 
before. In this case, the word coring does not come from the word core as used by 
Teece (2018), but from trying to establish the own product or service as core of a 
market or ecosystem, therefore the term is used independently. Coring describes a 
set of activities which aim to make the own platform, service, or product essential 
for a market or technological system. The goal is to position the own organization as 
the core of an ecosystem. This can be achieved by resolving a problem affecting a 
large proportion of other parts in the system. While that approach is rather 
technological, the business side is as important. On the business side, not only needs 
a platform to be accepted by the other players in the system, they also have to allow 
and incentify the development of complementarities for the core in order to be 
successful. Complementarities can be developed by the organization itself or by third 
parties. This thesis focuses on the development of complementarities by the 
organization itself. By being the core of a system, the organization builds an installed 
base and therefore makes it difficult for other companies to imitate their product, 
service, or platform. This installed base can later be used to make profit from 
complementarities. One example for the coring strategy is Google. The company 
started as a simple search engine and established itself as the core of the internet 
itself. They later built many different complementarities around the search engine; 
some developed by Google itself, some by others.  
 
Tipping focuses on systems, where different solutions to a problem already exist. 
The strategy aims to “tip” the market towards the own product. While traditional 
pipeline industries often allow many different organizations to share the market, this 
is not true for platforms. Most of the time, one strong platform emerges from the 
platform war (Eisenmann et al., 2006). In order to be the winning platform, it has to 
control the largest installed base. While it is always an advantage to be early in the 
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market, there are other elements which can help to grow the own installed base and 
lead the market. The installed base can also be won by offering the best 
complementarities.   
 
Table 1: Coring vs. Tipping strategies (Adapted from Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) 
 
Strategy Technology Actions Business Actions 
Coring 
  
• (C1) Solve an essential 
“system” problem 
• (C2) Keep intellectual 
property closed 
• (C3) Maintain strong 
interdependencies 
between core and 
complements 
 
• (C4) Solve an essential 
business problem for 
many industry players 
• (C5) Protect your main 
source of revenue and 
profit 
Tipping 
  
• (T1) Develop unique, 
compelling features 
that are hard to imitate 
and that attract users 
• (T2) Tip across 
markets: Offer features 
from an adjacent 
market 
 
• (T3) Provide more 
incentives for 
consumers and 
producers than your 
competitors do 
 
 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) have identified different action points that firms could 
use for either coring or tipping (Table 1). In their work, Gawer and Cusumano (2008) 
limit the creation of incentives to third parties which create complementarities. I will 
add to that by also looking at complementarities developed by the firm itself and 
which effects that has on using the strategies.  
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4 Method 
With the goal to explore how established firms can leverage their core assets to 
launch a digital platform and grow the installed base, I carried out this study using a 
qualitative case study approach in order to explore the causes and underlying 
principles of the platformization process. I conducted the case study at a start-up 
called Boneprox that currently operates in the eHealth sector in Norway and Sweden. 
A qualitative case study was reasonable for the research question because of its 
empirical nature and the allowance for in-depth explanations of a specific 
phenomenon in its natural context (Zainal, 2007). It further fits the rational of 
investigating a real-world phenomenon in order to achieve more than a surficial 
understanding (Yin, 2009). The case study was confined to investigate the 
platformization through coring and tipping in the eHealth industry.  
4.1 Research Setting 
Boneprox was founded in 2013 as a software company within the dental industry. 
Their offline product (Jaw-X) allowed dentists to get an automated analysis of an x-
ray scan of the lower jawbone to get an immediate response on the chances of the 
patient getting osteoporosis at a later age. Osteoporosis is a bone-illness, which 
results in increased bone fragility. 25% - 50% off all people are diagnosed with 
osteoporosis as they grow older, therefore this innovation provides the opportunity 
for treatment since the disease is not curable but preventable through changes in 
nutrition, exercise, or drugs.  
 
In 2013, the co-founders decided to offer their patented solution online on their own 
portal. Dental clinics could now easily upload x-ray scans and get an immediate 
result online from an Artificial Intelligence (AI). With the product having great 
success and winning many awards and public procurements, they took the next step 
in 2018 and started to offer additional services to their customers and transform their 
product into a platform. While the Osteoporosis-AI is called Boneprox-AI (BPX-
AI), the new specialist consultation platform is called ReferralExpress. With 
ReferralExpress, dentists could now upload different types of images (e.g. Cone 
beam computed tomography (CBCT) scans and other medical images) together with 
information about the patient and the referral in order to receive consultation from a 
specialist (e.g. radiologist). The specialist could then access the referrals on the 
platform and write the diagnosis directly online. That allowed dentist and specialists 
equally to digitalize their workflows since until then this process was done via 
standard mail and took days or even weeks instead of only few hours now. The dental 
clinics could access both services, BPX-AI and ReferralExpress, through the same 
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platform. Boneprox further offers other services like courses and technical service, 
which are not looked at in this paper.  
 
Two things are exceptional in the dental sector and the dentist-specialist relationship, 
which are relevant for this case study. Firstly, Swedish law requires every x-ray 
image to be send to a radiologist. Secondly, clinics and specialists usually have 
contracts with each other, which means that one dental clinic usually consults the 
same radiologist. This information is relevant for the results.  
4.2 Data collection 
To conduct the case study, the transaction data was analyzed, interviews were 
conducted, documents were reviewed, and secondary data was examined.  
 
Table 2: Data collection 
 
Data type Description Amount Time 
Referral data 
Extracted 
transactions from 
billing reports  
2.197 referrals 
July 2018 –  
February 2020 
Documents  
Internal 
documents from 
Boneprox 
20 
March 2019 –  
March 2020 
Interviews 
Semi-structured 
and unstructured 
interviews 
9 
(+5 secondary) 
February 2020 –  
March 2020 
 
4.2.1 Referral data 
To understand the underlying structure of the platformization, every transaction was 
gathered from semi-structured data and billing reports with every referral being equal 
to one transaction. A referral describes the act of referring someone for consultation. 
Each dataset consisted of information about the dentist, the specialist, the dental 
clinic, the patient, and the referral itself in form of image type, status, and date (see 
Appendix I). The data for the BPX-AI starts in July 2018, when the online portal was 
launched. Data on ReferralExpress start in November 2018, when the platform was 
released. Data was collected until the end of February 2020.  
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The data was extracted from billing reports to the dental clinics, separated between 
the BPX-AI and ReferralExpress. Overall, 2.197 transactions were analyzed, divided 
in 944 BPX-AI referrals and 1253 ReferralExpress referrals. The data was merged 
into one data model using the graph database neo4j (see Appendix I). The data model 
was built to make information on the relationships between the different user groups 
as easily accessible as possible. That allowed the generation of reports using the 
neo4j browser and the APOC-library (Awesome Procedures On Cypher), which 
could be extracted later and will be described in Section 4.3.   
4.2.2 Documents 
In order to get a better context on the referral data, several types of documents were 
analyzed. This includes protocols and presentations from board meetings, pitches to 
possible investors, and other documents.  Furthermore, the documents were used to 
gather additional data about the financials and business decisions made by the start-
up from 2018 to 2020. Some of this newly generated data was later merged with the 
referrals data in the results, which will be further described in Section 4.3.  
4.2.3 Interviews  
To get a better understanding of the industry, the history of Boneprox, their 
processes, the decisions made, and the platform, there were several contact points 
with the three co-founders. The three co-founders do now have the positions of Chief 
Execution Officer (CEO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), and Chief Sales Officer 
(CSO). There was continuous contact trough semi-structured interviews, mail and 
messenger exchange as well as unstructured conversations. Overall, 8 unstructured 
meetings were hold at the Boneprox Office in Gothenburg with the CEO, CTO, and 
CSO. The goal of these deep-dive sessions was to gain in-depth knowledge about the 
IT-architecture, to better understand the existing data, and to discuss business 
decisions. Whiteboard drawings, notes, and sketches from these meetings were later 
used to iteratively develop reports. Furthermore, I conducted a two-hour semi-
structured interview with the CEO and CSO, which was transcribed. Additionally, 
five interviews with dentists and specialists, conducted by another thesis group, were 
analyzed in order to gain a better understanding of how each user group interacts 
with the platform and what their needs are. These interviews were conducted in 
Swedish and were then transcribed. Occurring language barriers were resolved by 
Google Translate and native speakers. The different contacts generated in-depth 
knowledge about the activities and strategies followed by the start-up and helped 
very much to make sense of the provided data and documents. 
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4.3 Data analysis 
The analysis was guided by Gawer and Cusumano’s (2008) theory on coring and 
tipping strategies for digital platforms (see Section 3).  
 
The first step was to design a data model that puts the relationships between dentists, 
the platform, and specialists in focus (see Appendix I). After that, I wrote two 
different import scripts in order load the referral data into the model. One script 
loaded the BPX-AI data, the other one the ReferralExpress data. I automated this 
process in order to efficiently load the newest data at all times. In the next step, I 
coded 14 data views, each projecting a different dimension (e.g. monthly referrals of 
a specific specialist).  
 
The data gained from the transaction data (see Section 4.2.1) was exported from the 
neo4j browser and visualized into different tables and diagrams. Since the 
transformation and strategy decisions all include a crucial time aspect, the data was 
cumulated by weeks and/or month to see the process over time. This data was 
extended by the unstructured data received from documents (see Section 4.2.2). Here 
the financial data (e.g. revenue) were of largest interest and were used to expand the 
previously created tables and diagrams (see Section 5). Furthermore, some 
irregularities in the data could be explained through the nature of the business and 
industry (e.g. seasonal breaks, fairs, investor decisions, etc.).  
 
Overall, I developed six reports that I present in Section 5, each showing a different 
perspective on the development of Boneprox. These reports were developed 
iteratively and built the foundation for the interviews and guided the deeper analysis 
of strategic decisions made by the co-founders of Boneprox. It was important to have 
the raw data as a foundation for the qualitative analysis because it allowed a detailed 
and unbiased discussion about the firm’s development. The information gathered 
from the interviews was used to iteratively develop the reports and guidelines. The 
notes and sketches from the unstructured interviews were used as feedback and were 
continuously integrated in the existing report sheet.  
 
When developing the guidelines for a successful platformization, the transaction data 
could also be used to confirm the impact of the decisions made by the co-founders. 
Overall, I always looked at the referral data, unstructured data and interviews 
together as one view on the firm. This allowed me to develop guidelines, which 
provide an all-around perspective of platformization.  
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5 Platformization at Boneprox 
The story of Boneprox started in 2013, when two of the co-founders went to 
Jönköping International Business School together. As part of a school project, a co-
founder’s grandfather offered them to collaborate with him on the marketing of his 
patented software “Jaw-X”. The software was able to calculate the risk of a patient 
getting osteoporosis at a later age and was distributed to dental clinics via usb-stick 
from which the software could be installed. The two students were that amazed by 
the product, that they decided to get a license for the software in exchange for a 
royalty payment and started a business. Together with the third co-founder, they 
decided to implement the solution as a cloud-based service: The Boneprox-AI (BPX-
AI) was born.  
 
“They [the clinics] all saw the added value for the patients, so they started 
using it and then it started escalating from there.” 
(CEO) 
 
As they developed the portal, they constantly gathered feedback from the clinics 
which already used the Jaw-X software. The feedback was extraordinarily positive 
and so they continued to work on the algorithm and the online platform. Boneprox 
managed to gain momentum and acquired more dental clinics over the following few 
years to use their software. During these years, Boneprox followed the Coring 
strategy (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). With an algorithm and technology which was 
completely new to the market, they managed to solve the essential system problem 
(C1, see table 1) of transferring and saving highly sensitive patient data in a secure 
and safe way. Before, clinics had to print out the scans and send them to a specialist 
via mail, who then also answered via mail. At the same time, they solved an essential 
business problem (C4) for the clinics in form of the osteoporosis analysis that the 
clinics could use to create a better customer experience and protect the health of their 
patients. Together with the patented algorithm, Boneprox kept its intellectual 
property close (C2) and therefore protected their main source of revenue and profit 
(C5).  
 
In 2016, the Swedish government issued a public procurement to find a solution for 
age assessment based on x-ray scans of jawbones. With already having a portal in 
place which can handle these types of images in a very secure and fast way, 
Boneprox applied for the procurement and won.  
 
“In the beginning they told us ‘you’re testing 500 people’, at the end we were 
testing 14.000 in a year. There was a lot of work put into this.” 
(CSO) 
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“That was kind of a quality stamp on what we are doing. We were not only 
these three young entrepreneurs with this cool technology, instead we had 
services that somehow showed the market that we are credible. That’s 
probably the ultimate stamp when the government is hiring your services.” 
(CEO) 
 
With the momentum gained from the winning of the public procurement, Boneprox 
managed to attract more clinics. At this point, Boneprox was still following the 
Coring strategy to become the leading platform in the risk calculation of 
osteoporosis. The public procurement not only gave them a great selling point when 
talking to new potential customers, Boneprox now also a was more interesting to 
investors. As a reward for their hard work during that time, Boneprox won the DNB 
(Den norske Bank) Healthcare Price 2017 and received the Seal of Excellence by the 
European Commission.  
 
Around the same time, Boneprox often got the same feedback from dentist when 
they were asked about the portal: Clinics wanted to upload other types of images and 
referrals and get the results as fast and accurate as they were used to from the BPX-
AI. Having that knowledge, together with the momentum they got from the public 
procurement, they started a collaboration with a radiologist to investigate possible 
solutions.  
 
“With that radiologist, we got the information that you have to, by law, send 
certain types of 3D images, scans of the head, to a radiologist. So, we saw if 
we get into that market, there is a recurrent revenue, automatic, because of 
the law.” 
(CSO) 
 
Using their core technology to transfer and store medical images efficiently, they 
started to build a new platform in 2018 by adding complementary services to their 
portal. With the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and other local 
regulations being implemented during that time, Boneprox was able to solve an 
essential problem to many players in the industry (C4). It was required by law to 
send certain x-ray images to a radiologist, which was usually done via post mail. 
This results in a demand for radiologists in the dental sector. Eventually the new 
platform launched in July 2018, at which point it was still only offering the 
osteoporosis analysis. Then in November 2018, they launched their new product 
ReferralExpress. The dentist could now upload multiple categories of referrals: 
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Radiology, Cone beam computed tomography (CBCT), which is a 3D scan of the 
whole head, and Muscular Change (MC), which are usually photos of the mouth. 
The dentist added descriptions and rudimental patient data to generate a referral. This 
referral was then analyzed by a specialist and the feedback was received within 24 
hours, conveniently in the same platform as all other referrals and osteoporosis 
analyses. The revenue for every referral was split between the specialist and 
Boneprox. The main driver for the revenue is the analysis of CBCT scans. Dental 
clinics later said that the new functionality did not feel like another product as more 
as an additional functionality. By integrating the new ReferralExpress into the 
existing platform, Boneprox maintained strong interdependencies between core and 
complementarities (C3). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Referrals: BPX-AI vs. ReferralExpress 
 
With the launch of the new platform at the end of 2018, the focus rapidly started to 
shift from BPX-AI towards the new ReferralExpress (see Figure 3). ReferralExpress 
can be seen as a complementary service to the core product BPX-AI. While the 
number of referrals uploaded to BPX-AI slowly decreased, the number of referrals 
uploaded to ReferralExpress significantly increased. One of the major decisions 
made was the change of the pricing model. While clinics previously used a pay-as-
use license, the start-up now offered a subscription-based model. With paying a 
monthly fee, the clinics now got unlimited access to the BPX-AI and additionally 
paid the specialist consultations (see Appendix II). The shift shown in Figure 3 and 
4 shows a successful transition of the business model, since the core product still 
created the essential revenue stream “to keep the lights on” and the 
complementarities increase and created the winnings for the company. 
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Figure 3: Active Users: BPX-AI vs. ReferralExpress 
 
The same development was observed when looking at the active users each month 
that used each of the services (see Figure 4). Here, the number of active users of 
BPX-AI was stagnating but not decreasing, causing an even more solid essential 
revenue stream in the new pricing model. This further means there were users 
coming to the platform that only used the complementary services.  
 
After the platform was launched successfully, the founders concentrated on the 
acquisition of new investors in the first half of 2019 to be able to scale the platform 
up and develop more functionalities. Additionally to the DNB Healthcare price 
money (1 MSEK), Boneprox was able to get more funding from Innovation Norway 
(1,2 MSEK) and further closed several cooperation and partnerships with hospitals 
and dental chains.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: New Users 
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As it is shown in Figure 5, also the number of new users each month decreased in 
the first half of 2019. This demonstrates that the amount of workforce which is 
invested into the acquisition of new customers was correlated to the number of new 
users. In reverse conclusion, the number of new users increased after more focus was 
put on the acquisition of new customers again after the summer of 2019. 
 
With entering the market of specialist consultations, Boneprox also made a shift in 
strategy from Coring to Tipping strategies (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). While they 
still used Coring strategies and the BPX-AI to attract more customers towards the 
platform with traditional tools like marketing, exhibitions, mailing, and personal 
contact, they increasingly had to work on tipping the market towards their direction 
by developing unique, compelling features that are hard to imitate and attract users 
(T1). Boneprox achieved that with offering a fast and secure way to process referrals.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Referral Express 
 
Figure 6 shows that the analysis of CBCT scans was clearly the most used service 
on ReferralExpress. Due to the fact that every x-ray image has to be send to a 
radiologist, on the one hand there was a natural high demand for these analyses but 
on the other hand every clinic already had a contracted radiologist. Boneprox 
cancelled the partnership with the initial radiologist and started a new partnership 
with another radiologist specialized in dental scans. The explosion of referrals 
starting in mid-2019 is also caused by the new radiologist who increased the quality 
of CBCT consultations. Other specialist consultations on the other hand were only 
increasing slowly. This was mainly for the reason that there is no law to make 
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referrals in this case, which is the case for CBCT scans. Clinics did not make many 
referrals in MC or common Radiology before there was a digital solution available 
because it was often too expensive and complicated. The slow increase shows, that 
there was a basic interest in this services and interviews with clinics showed, that 
they were just not used to having the opportunity to get an analysis this efficiently. 
However, there are no observable cross-selling effects, which means that clinics 
which used one service, did not tend to use another service offered by Boneprox.  
 
“We have taken 15% when it comes to CBCT in Norway and 10% in Sweden, 
people are losing business to us. [...] Until we have reached a certain market 
share, I don’t think that people [specialists] will join us. Once we have 
reached a certain market share, then people have to lay down their axe and 
will join us. If they can’t beat us, they join us.” 
(CSO) 
 
Once the platform volume is exaggerating the one specialist’s capacity, Boneprox 
will face the challenge that they need more than one specialist for CBCT scans 
analyzing the referrals. The Boneprox founders are sure that this will happen round 
about the time other radiologists will have to join their platform in order to remain 
in the business because Boneprox is taking to many market shares. Once new 
radiologists will join the platform, they will have to bring their already contracted 
clinics to the platform and therefore will cause exponential growth effects and the 
market will eventually tip in their favor. Boneprox used tipping strategies by 
providing more incentives than competitors do and develop unique, compelling 
features that will attract more users (T1).  
 
 
I was very happy when they called me, and it was no hard decision to join the 
team. It’s been a pleasant journey from day one. 
(Radiologist) 
 
“We are becoming the friend of the dentist” 
(CSO) 
 
The most common feedback was the ease of use and the extraordinary response time, 
as well as the quality of the analysis delivered by the specialist. With already having 
one other specialists for other referrals than CBCT, Boneprox currently works to add 
more types of images and types of analysis to the platform. While CBCT scan 
consultation remains the main driver for revenue because of the law to send images 
to a radiologist, the addition of more complementary services is a good selling point. 
All in all, the selling strategy shifted towards the advertisement of complementary 
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services after the number of active users pass the number of active users of Boneprox 
AI in autumn 2019 (see Figure 4).  
 
“We are seeing that clinics start by using one service and then they change to 
use other services” 
(CEO) 
 
The idea is to offer more services to the clinics and try to profit from spillover effects. 
Once a clinic has experienced the platform, they are more likely to use other 
functionalities of the platform as well. As shown in Figure 6, the spillover effects did 
not happen in a significant way yet and the analysis of CBCT scan was the main 
driver for the revenue.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Number of Referrals vs. Active Users 
 
Adding to this, it can be observed that the average usage per clinic was not increasing 
in a significant way (see Figure 7). The number of total referrals uploaded (BPX-AI 
and ReferralExpress combined) were strongly correlated to the number of active 
users on the platform. That means the usage of the same service per clinic did not 
increase. According to the tipping strategy, this behavior of customers can be 
changed by creating new incentives (T3) for customers. Boneprox plans to create 
these incentives by adding more functionalities in form of different types of analysis 
offered.  
 
But not only did Boneprox continuously offer more functionalities on the platform 
as complementarities and worked on make their core asset of secure data transfer 
even better, they further worked on different integrations into other software’s and 
machines, for example the operation system of a x-ray scanner which can upload the 
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image directly to the platform. Seeking collaborations with possible competitors in 
order to gain a larger installed base is also a known tipping strategy. With getting a 
more and more diverse installed base, Boneprox also planned to expand their 
subscription-based pricing model and wanted to start offering different packages 
with different pricing structures to fit every dental clinic needs on a fair price (see 
Appendix II).  
 
“We want clinics to use Boneprox every single day.” 
(CSO) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Overall Development of Boneprox 
 
As shown in Figure 8, the total number of referrals (BPX-AI + ReferralExpress) 
developed steadily and had more than doubled within the first year after the launch 
of ReferralExpress. The start-up was able to attract new customers without losing 
many of the previous customers (also see Figures 5 and 6). Dips in the graph in the 
middle and end of years are caused by the holiday seasons, which naturally means 
little activity in the dental clinics and therefore a lower market volume. Following 
that trend, also the monthly revenue of the company has nearly tripled in 2019 alone. 
With the main reasons for that being the increasing number of active users and 
referrals each month, also the change in the pricing model made the company more 
efficient. The revenue peak in mid-2019 also came from payments for the public 
procurement.  
 
The data in Figure 8 shows that Boneprox was successfully combining coring and 
tipping strategies at the same time. On the one hand, they solved essential system 
and business problems (C1, C4) by offering a digital solution to the dental 
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consultation sector. They were able to keep the intellectual property closed and 
protect the main source of revenue (C2, C5) while maintaining strong 
interdependencies between core and complementarities (C3) in order to preserving 
high switching costs. That guaranteed an essential revenue stream which allows 
innovation. On the other hand, Boneprox was able to tip the specialist-consultancy 
market in their favor by offering unique, compelling features (T1). At the same time, 
they provided high incentives to join the platform (T3) by continuously adding new 
complementary services to the platform. Furthermore, they attracted possible 
emerging competitors into coalitions to deliver an integrated solution to their users. 
By reaching out to hardware companies to integrate their solution, they also tried to 
tip across markets (T2).  
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6 Discussion 
This paper contributes to the digital platform and platformization research by 
conducting a case study of a start-up in the eHealth industry. The research question 
guiding this investigation is:  
 
How do established firms leverage core assets to launch a platform and grow 
the installed base? 
 
 
Figure 8: Timeline 
 
The case study start-up actively designed the process of shifting from a pipeline 
business towards a digital platform (see Figure 9). I could observe that the start-up 
leveraged their already existing core assets at all times in order to gain momentum 
and further grow the installed base. I contribute five guidelines on how to grow an 
installed base by leveraging the core asset.  
 
I could observe that the main reason for a successful platformization was the 
combination of coring and tipping strategies. When marketing the core asset, the case 
study company was established by solving an essential technological problem 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). By solving this problem, they created a new product 
that has not existed before and therefore did not have any competitors. That allowed 
the firm to acquire many customers without being identified as a threat to existing 
players in the specialist consultation market. Customers stayed on the platform 
because of the high interdependencies of core and complementarities, since they 
were offered on the same platform.  Only after they reached a critical mass and had 
a mature technology, they started to use tipping strategies by offering unique, 
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compelling features (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Companies could later shift back 
to coring strategies if they decide to launch complementarities that have not existed 
before in the market or when they want to offer the services in an adjacent market. 
In this case, the company would use coring and tipping strategies at the same time, 
for the same product, in different markets. I show that it is not a transition or shift 
from coring to tipping strategies, but that they are used in combination throughout 
the whole process. I provide five guidelines designed from my observations (Table 
3).  
 
Table 3: Guidelines 
 
Guidelines Underlying Theory 
Oberservations in 
Case Study 
Guarantee a smooth 
transition for existing 
customers 
Platform Envelopment  
(Eisenmann et al., 
2007) 
High user overlap from 
existing and new 
market 
 
Same online portal 
Develop a hybrid business 
model 
Hybrid Business 
Model (Zhu & Furr, 
2016) 
Integrate prices for 
complementarities into 
subscription-based 
model for core asset 
Reuse the technology 
Economies of Scope 
(Panzar & Willig, 
1981) 
Reuse technology for 
secure transfer and 
storage of highly 
sensitive medical 
images 
Capture spillover of trust 
Start with a defensible 
product  
(Zhu & Furr, 2016) 
Generate trust by 
winning public awards 
and certification by the 
government 
Shift to resource 
orchestration  
From resource control 
to resource 
orchestration (Van 
Alstyne et al., 2016) 
Use different specialist 
for different fields; 
Create incentives for 
them instead of 
controlling them 
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The first guideline I suggest to successfully launch a platform is to guarantee a 
smooth transition from the perspective of existing customers. The case study 
company firstly made their core asset available on a new online portal without 
changing the functionalities, so it felt just like a re-design for the customer. Only 
after giving the users a few months to get used to the new portal, the new 
complementary services were added. While internally the complementarities were 
handled as a second revenue stream and were managed differently from the core 
asset, it did not feel to the customer as a shift or change but as an additional service. 
By doing that the customer was left with the choice to use the new services or not, 
but none of the existing customers was scared of. Eisenmann et al. (2007) previously 
observed this strategy as platform envelopment, where platform owners use the 
existing installed base to lower the entry barriers into a new market. The case study 
actively looked for the highest possible user overlap to establish the existing installed 
base in a new market. At the same time the transition was designed very smooth so 
that there were no losses of the installed base in the existing market. Zhu and Furr 
(2016) also refer to this observation as the rapid conversion to the platform to make 
users of the initial product to users of the new platform. As previously observed by 
Eisenmann et al. (2007), this guideline can be transferred to other markets and 
platforms, although different conditions may apply.  
 
The second guideline is to develop a hybrid business model. I could observe that 
changes in strategy and sales decisions were hidden from the users, which relates 
strongly to the previous guideline. It adds to it in a way that it was also suggested by 
the pricing model. The price did not change for the core asset and the 
complementarities were integrated into a hybrid business model (Zhu & Furr, 2016). 
By doing so, the company is able to secure an existing revenue stream and will not 
lose existing customers. These customers can also be transformed into the installed 
base of the digital platform by cross selling the core asset and complementarities 
(Teece, 2018). This observation can easily be transferred into other markets and 
industries, since it is in the full control of the company to design its own 
platformization process.  
 
The third guideline I contribute is the reuse of the core technology and applying the 
Economics of Scope (Panzar & Willig, 1981). For the case study company, it was 
possible to use the existing technology to build complementarities (Teece, 2018). By 
doing so, they were able to generate a competitive advantage by having much lower 
R&D costs than any other existing player in the market. Furthermore, the operational 
and fix costs were comparatively low because they could be spread between the 
different products. The economies of scope are a widely applicable concept which 
can be projected to many industries (Panzar & Willig, 1981). 
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The fourth guideline I suggest is to capture the spillover of trust from the initial 
product to the platform. Not only is it more efficient than for other industry players 
that do not have that technology (see guideline 3), but it also uses the image and trust 
laid into the company by existing customers. This guideline goes hand in hand with 
the first guideline but focusses on capturing the good relationship with partners and 
customers and therefore stands on its own. The case study company did so by 
winning a public procurement and winning several awards and certifications. By 
using the same technology for the complementarities, also the trust into the firm 
could be transferred towards the newly launched digital platform. This factor can 
also be seen in Zhu & Furr’s (2016) first step and is projectable to other markets as 
well. While trust is one of the most important factors in the eHealth industry, it can 
also be valuable in other industries to have a good image before introducing new 
services to the market. The trust does not mandatorily have to come from the 
government but can be gained through many ways.  
 
My fifth guideline is the shift from resource control to resource orchestration (Van 
Alstyne et al., 2016). While the shift should be invisible for the customer (see 
guidelines 1 and 2), it is even more important to make this shift in the business 
processes. The case study company started to make this shift by not making any 
specialist consultations themselves but contracting specialists for different fields. 
Later in the process, they planned to attract more than one specialist for each field to 
the platform, which is the next step in the process of shifting to resource 
orchestration. They tried to achieve resource orchestration because control over 
resources do not guarantee for a competitive advantage, but they must be used and 
managed efficiently (Sirmon et al., 2011). By not contracting specialist, they gained 
this efficiency. Not only did the shift allow them to focus on sales and the 
development of new functionalities, it also made them very flexible and lowered the 
fix costs since they did not have to pay salaries for the external resources but only as 
they were needed and used.  One example was the change of radiologist in summer 
2019 that made the CBCT consultation more valuable and therefore attracted more 
customers and grew the installed base. In order not to be dependent, the company 
created incentives for external resources instead of controlling them. The company 
leveraged their core asset to introduce more services and functionalities to the market 
by only controlling the core asset and orchestrating other resources to establish new 
complementarities. The situation in the eHealth industry is very special due to a lot 
of laws and regulations, nevertheless it is possible for others to project this strategy.  
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7 Conclusion 
This study answers the question how established companies can leverage their core 
assets in order to launch a digital platform and grow their installed base. I conducted 
a case study at a successful start-up in the eHealth sector. Gawer and Cusumano’s 
(2008) theory of coring and tipping strategies was used as a conceptual framework 
and theoretical lens on the results.  
 
I contribute five guidelines that I think are essential for a successful platformization: 
Guarantee a smooth transition for existing customers, Develop a hybrid business 
model, Reuse the technology, Capture spillover of trust, and Shift to resource 
orchestration. While many of these observations may transferred to other companies 
in the platformization process, these observations are highly sensitive to the industry, 
market and other circumstances. The framework provided a useful foundation for the 
conducted case study and laid the foundation for a focused analysis of the results.  
 
This paper contributes to theory that coring and tipping strategies can be used 
combined to leverage core assets to grow an installed base. The gained trust by 
solving a small but relevant system problem in an efficient and secure way, can later 
be used to enter an existing market and tip the market by offering unique and 
compelling features. Furthermore, I expand the framework by applying it to 
proprietary services instead of only focusing on complementarities provided by third 
parties. I further contribute to practice the five guidelines I formulated during the 
case study of a start-up in the eHealth industry. While not all success factors will be 
applicable in every market for every company, I offer some guidance to established 
firms that go through the process of platformization.  
 
The scope of this study presents some limitations. Firstly, the case study company 
was founded in 2013 and is therefore relatively new. It is unclear, in what degree the 
results are applicable for firms with older structures. In addition to that, the case 
study company was founded as a technology company, so that the gap between the 
old and new business model was comparatively narrow. It is not sure if there will be 
other obstacles for firms that are not native digital. Therefore, to complete the 
findings of this study, future research should focus on the generalizability of the 
guidelines to other firms and industries.   
 
I have identified that the studied company was able to leverage their core assets in 
order to launch a new digital platform and grow their installed base successfully. The 
platformization is an ongoing process for the company and they continuously make 
improvements to their strategy.  
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9 Appendices 
Appendix I – Data Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Type of nodes (anonymized) 
 
Clinic:  
 
 
Specialist:   
 
(BPX-AI is declared as a specialist with the field “Osteoporosis”) 
 
Dentist:  
 
 
Referral:  
  
(Type of referral (ReferralExpress/BPX-AI) are distinguished in the attribute “type”)   
  
Appendix II – Pricing Model 
 
2013 – Summer 2018  
 
Price per Analysis: 150 SEK  
 
Summer 2018 – March 2020 
 
Subscription Fee: 450 SEK  
Price per Analysis 
Boneprox AI: free 
CBCT: 790 – 1000 SEK (Individual prices)  
MC: 350 SEK 
Radiology: 400 SEK 
 
From March 2020 
 
 
 
Note: Already includes new functionalities, CBCT prices are negotiated individually and are 
dependent on the size of the dental clinic 
